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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this project is to model municipal audit fees using an audit economics framework 
and then analyze this conceptual framework empirically using structural equation modeling, 
because structural equation models are excellent for examining complex and interdependent 
environments.  The sample is large cities using 1996 data.  The theoretical model uses five 
constructs to explain audit fees:  (1) client size, (2) complexity of client operations, (3) financial 
risks including demographic characteristics, (4) auditing factors, and (5) governance structure.  
The final model includes six variables directly related to audit fee plus five mediating variables.  
The results demonstrate that SEM modeling can explain audit fees and provides more information 
on how the highly correlated independent variables are interrelated in the context of explaining 
audit fee levels. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
overnmental audit fee models are well established in the literature.  Most are run with large numbers of 
independent variables, usually a dozen or more.  For example, Ward et al. (1994) used a 21-variable model 
to analyze audit fees of Michigan cities.  A possible rationale for researchers to use big models is that with 
a large sample size, most variables are statistically significant.  Despite obvious correlation across variables, 
standard diagnostics (e.g., variance inflation factors) generally don’t indicate a multicollinearity problem when using 
regression.   
 
In a large-variable framework, this approach can be considered conceptually inferior to a more detailed 
analysis available through structural equation modeling (SEM).  Important conceptual issues and interrelationships 
should be explored to better understand how audit fees are structured.  The purpose of this project is to model 
municipal audit fees using an audit economics framework and then explore this conceptual framework empirically 
using SEM.  SEM has not been used in the context of audit fees and should be relevant given the complexity of the 
model building.  In addition to the analysis of direct effects analyzed in regression, the indirect effects should have 
important implications on multidimensional relationships.  A sample of large cities using data from 1996 is used for 
analysis.  Although there are several auditing studies (and an occasional governmental study) that use SEM, none of 
these focuses on audit fees and few use archival data. 
 
Our investigation is important for several reasons.  First, there are relatively few governmental fee studies 
and each generally tests different types of governments for different time periods.  Second, the SEM approach 
provides information on the interrelations across important variables.  Third, the SEM results will be compared to 
OLS regression, a typical approach for analyzing audit fees.  The comparison will demonstrate the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the two approaches.    
 
When interested only in the direct effects of independent variables on audit fees, OLS regression usually 
would be preferred to SEM.  In fact, the direct effects SEM explanatory power as measured by R
2
 is usually similar 
to OLS without the complexity of evaluating indirect effects and covariation across exogenous variables.   
 
G 
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The SEM approach concentrates on model fit, based on standardized coefficient evaluation, goodness of fit 
statistics, and other diagnostics.  SEM provides a much richer analysis of the municipal audit environment, 
incorporating the mediation processes (indirect effects) determined simultaneously in the model.  For example, 
population has both a substantial direct effect on audit fees and indirect effects through client complexity 
(component units) and big 6 auditors. Governance structure has no direct effect on audit fees, but the empirical 
surrogate, city manager, influences audit fees through client complexity (tax share) and financial risk (financial 
viability). Thus, a seemingly insignificant variable city manager, influences audit fees. 
 
The next section reviews the literature on audit fee and SEM in auditing.  Section three provides model 
development based on audit economics theory and previous literature.  Section four describes the sample.  Section 
five explains the SEM approach and other empirical methods used for analysis.  Section six analyzes the results and 
the last section concludes. 
 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT  
 
Empirical testing of audit fee models started with Simunic (1980) using commercial firms and Baber et al. 
(1987) using local governments.  The current audit fee model uses five theoretical constructs to explain the level of 
audit fees.  The theoretical constructs and specific variables selected are based on their use in prior studies.
1
 The five 
constructs are:  (1) client size, (2) complexity of client operations, (3) financial risks including demographic 
characteristics, (4) auditing factors, and (5) governance structure.  Client size should be associated with audit 
complexity.  Larger organizations require more audit effort because there are more transactions.  Complex client 
operations are expected to require more audit time and greater expertise, both expected to increase the cost of the 
audit.  Auditors are increasingly focusing on financial risk to determine the level of audit effort (e.g., internal control 
checks and substantive testing) and audit pricing (Rubin 1988, Deis and Giroux 1996).  There are several auditing 
factors that can influence audit fees.  The type of auditor’s opinion, whether this is a first year audit, and whether a 
Big 6 auditor is used are examples.  Finally, the governance structure is expected to influence many factors related 
to client complexity and financial risk and, therefore, audit effort and price.  The initial model, including empirical 
surrogates used to test the theoretical constructs, is presented in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 
Initial Model 
Theoretical Construct Empirical Surrogate Expected 
Sign 
I.  Client Size Population (LNPOP) + 
II. Complexity of Client Operations Own Source Revenues per Capita (TAXSHARE) + 
 Defined Benefit Pensions Overfunded Dummy (PENSION) + 
 Component units (COMPUNIT) + 
III.  Financial Risk (including Demographic 
Characteristics) 
Debt outstanding per capita (DEBTPC) + 
 Financial viability (FV) - 
 Surplus/deficit (SURDEF) - 
 Average Income (AVGINC) - 
 Population change, 1990-96 (CPOP) ? 
IV.  Auditing Factors  Audit Opinion (AUDOPN) - 
 Big 6 Auditor (BIG6) + 
 Initial Audit (FIRSTYR) - 
 Busy Season (BSAUD)  
V.  Governance Structure City Manager or Mayor (MGR) - 
 Certificate of Achievement (CA) - 
 
 
The log of audit fees (LNFEE) is used as the dependent variable.  Population is used to capture relative 
client size.  The log of population (LPOP) is used in the multivariate analysis to control for skewness.  Following 
Rubin (1988), Bamber et al. (1993) and McLelland and Giroux (2000), a positive sign is expected.   
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Three variables are used as surrogates for the complexity of the municipalities’ operations.  Own source 
taxes usually represent the most stable revenue source and also demonstrate the relative wealth of the government.  
TAXSHARE is own source revenues per capita, as measured by (total revenue less intergovernmental grants) / 
population.  It is not clear what the effect on audit fees is.  Higher audit fees associated with a higher local revenue 
stream may represent more transactions to audit; alternatively, TAXSHARE may indicate more sophisticated 
financial-related technology that improves audit efficiency.  No sign is predicted.  Defined benefit pension plans are 
complex, require additional audit time, and increase financial risk when under funded.  PENSION is measured as a 
dummy variable where 1=an over funded defined benefit pension plan.  An under funded plan suggests greater audit 
risk; therefore, the coefficient should be negative.  Component units are legally separate organizations for which the 
elected officials of the primary government are financially accountable (Government Accounting Standards Board 
Statement No. 14, 1991).  The number of component units reported by the city is used (COMPUNIT), a measure of 
additional complexity and additional audit effort to comply with GASB No. 14.  The additional audit time required 
should result in a positive sign (McLelland and Giroux, 2000).  
 
Five variables are used as proxies for financial risk, three related to financial characteristics of the city plus 
two demographics factors.  Debt per capita (DEBTPC) is used to proxy for credit risk.  Higher debt levels are 
associated with greater credit risk and a positive sign is expected.  Financial viability (FV), defined as the ratio of 
general fund equity divided by general fund revenues, is used as an empirical surrogate for financial condition 
(McLelland and Giroux, 2002).  The relative equity position in the general fund is an indicator of financial health, 
roughly analogous to retained earnings for a commercial firm.  A low measure can signal fiscal stress, increasing 
audit risk.  A negative sign is expected.  Running a current fiscal-year deficit should indicate increasing financial 
risk.  Surplus/deficit (SURDEF) is measure as revenues/expenditures.  A value of one represents a balances budget, 
greater than one a surplus, and less than one a deficit.  A negative sign is predicted. 
 
Demographic characteristics represent the economic base of the city, both related to potential revenues and 
relative spending requirements.  The two measures are average income and population change.  Average income 
(AVGINC) is a proxy for financial strength and a negative coefficient expected in the fee model, associated with 
lower audit risk (Baber et al. 1987, Deis and Giroux 1996).  Income levels are usually associated with greater 
financial health and a negative coefficient is predicted.  Population change (CPOP) should capture the relative 
population dynamics.  “Rust belt” cities typically have declining populations, while “sunbelt” cities often have 
growing populations.  Both substantial increases and decreases in population may cause disruptions that could 
increase audit risk and no sign is predicted.   
 
 Three auditor-related variables which are common in the literature are analyzed.  The audit opinion 
(OPINION) is a dummy variable, where 1 = a clean opinion.  A qualified opinion indicates audit problems and 
should be associated with greater audit risk and therefore a higher fee.  In most audit fee studies, a premium for a 
BIG6 auditor is found, usually associated with the reputation effect (e.g., Copley et al. 1995).  An initial audit 
(FIRSTYR) may be associated with “low balling,” which would reduce audit fees (DeAngelo 1981).  A positive sign 
is predicted for BIG 6, a negative sign for OPINION and FIRSTYR.  The auditor busy season generally extends 
from January to April, but audit fee results are mixed (McLelland and Giroux 2000).  We measure busy season 
(BSAUD) as a dummy variable coded 1 when the fiscal year-end of the city is between October 31 and December 
31.  It is expected that a busy season audit will increase audit fees. 
 
 The alternative governance structures (MGR) in cities are (1) city manager and (2) mayor-council.  The 
mayor-council form means that the chief executive is elected and presumably is interested in reelection.  The city 
manager is a full-time professional manager.  The city manager structure has obvious principal-agent relationships, 
with the city manager the agent of the city council (Selden et al., 1999).  This should be associated with a strong 
financial structure free of fiscal stress, relatively low taxes and low debt levels, a problem-free audit, and financial 
reports that signal complete reporting in a competent manner.  The mayor-council governance structure should be 
associated with a focus on political rather than financial characteristics, such as meeting the needs of important 
special interests.  Therefore, there are few obvious incentives to achieve a strong financial structure.  Assuming that 
governance structure incentives predominate (that is, regulatory environment and economic conditions are relatively 
less important), the city manager form should result in lower audit costs and a negative sign expected.   
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 Cities can sign up to be inspected for a Certificate of Achievement (CA), indicating excellence in financial 
reporting for those receiving the CA.  Receiving a CA suggests a city committed to transparency and implies lower 
audit risk.  A negative coefficient is forecast. 
 
SAMPLE 
 
 To test the audit fee model, we use a national sample of cities with populations exceeding 100,000 for the 
fiscal year ending in 1996.  The 1996 period was over a decade after significant regulatory changes and was well 
into the economic boom of the 1990s.  Annual reports were received from 166 cities in 1996 over 100,000 in 
population.  One hundred and forty-one cities responded to an audit fee questionnaire.  Non-response testing 
indicated no difference in the two samples.  One city with missing information was eliminated, reducing the final 
sample to 140.  Small sample size is an issue with SEM and standard rules of thumb suggest a minimum 100 or 200 
observations to generate valid goodness of fit measures (Smith and Langfield-Smith 2004).  To compensate for the 
relatively small sample size, multiple goodness of fit measures are analyzed (Donnelly et al. 2003).  
 
METHOD 
 
The variable of interest is audit fees for 1996.  Audit fees are expected to be explained based on the 
theoretical constructs associated with client size, operating complexity of the client, financial risks, auditing factors, 
and municipal governance structure.  Fourteen empirical variables are initially used to test the five constructs 
identified in the theoretical model.  Descriptive statistics for these variables include mean, standard deviation, and 
range.   
 
Multivariate analysis uses a structural equation modeling (SEM) procedure.
2
  Four steps are used to 
construct the SEM model:  (1) model specification; (2) model identification; (3) goodness of fit; and (4) model 
modifications.  Model development is based on expected theoretical relationships and correlations as measures of 
potentially significant relationships; consequently, a correlation matrix is shown and evaluated.  Multivariate 
analysis includes SEM and an OLS regression analysis for comparison.
3
 The OLS models use the same variables 
identified in the initial and final SEM models.  Stepwise regression also is used to come up with an OLS-generated 
parsimonious model.   
 
Figure 1 is used as the starting point to develop the SEM model specification.  This is a path diagram based 
on the theoretical model building described above.  There are five theoretical constructs, each representing a latent 
variable (that is, the theoretical constructs not directly observable) and presented in the ovals.  Specific empirical 
surrogates to test these relationships are in the rectangles, with expected directional relationships shown by arrows.  
These relationships will be refined through the iterative SEM process.   
 
Correlation analysis is used to understand basic empirical relationships across the variables under study.  
Correlations are used as the starting point for converting the theoretical model to SEM testing.  Significant 
relationships are used to construct a new path diagram to be empirically tested using CALIS, the SEM program 
available on SAS.  The analysis takes multiple iterations to determine the best available model (model trimming), 
using maximum likelihood (ML) estimation.  A key consideration is the various indirect effects that are modeled 
using SEM, but would be ignored when using standard regression procedures.  Statistical diagnostics based on 
covariance analysis are extensive and the final model should include all significant relationships of theoretical 
interest.  As part of the SEM process, latent structures were evaluated using confirmatory factor analysis.  These 
performed poorly and are not used.  This analysis uses only empirical (also called observed or manifest) variables. 
 
The SEM approach provides preliminary results, including a thorough set of diagnostics.  The overall 
model includes a set of goodness of fit tests, such as the goodness of fit index.  The model fit is evaluated with the 
standardized coefficient estimates based on maximum likelihood.  The exogenous variables are not evaluated, but 
the covariances of exogenous variables are reviewed to determine if these relationships should be incorporated in the 
overall model.  Additional tests are used to consider all potential fits of variables not in the original model and the 
impact of the error terms.  The key is significant relationships.  Insignificant relationships generally are deleted and 
all significant relationships are included (these are usually done one variable at a time since all relationships are 
tested simultaneously). 
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Total Assets 
Figure 1 
Conceptual Audit Fee Model (Simplified) 
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RESULTS 
 
Results include an analysis of both univariate and multivariate analysis.  Univariate tests include a 
descriptive analysis and correlations.  Multivariable results are based on the SEM model, which are compared to 
OLS regression results.  Univariate results are summarized in Tables 2 (descriptive) and 3 (correlations).  The final 
SEM results are summarized in Figure 2 and OLS results in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
Univariate Results 
 
 Table 2 summarizes univariate results for the sample of 140 large cities with complete data.  The average 
audit fee was almost $120,000, with a large range of $21,000 to over $1 million.  Descriptive results worth 
reviewing include the following.  Over 64% of the cities were under funded, an unexpected finding given a robust 
economy.  Ninety-three per cent of the cities had unqualified opinions, with only ten modified reports.  The Big 6 
audited 75 (53.6%) of the large cities, and 17 cities (12.1%) changed auditors in 1996.  Eighty-three cities used city 
managers (59.3%), while 119 (85.0%) received a Certificate of Achievement. 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Analysis (n=140) 
 
Panel A:  Continuous Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
Audit Fee $119,598 146,634 21,000 1,075,000 
Population 310,879 428,048 100,000 3,554,000 
Tax Share $692 356 231 2,352 
Component Units 4.48 3.82 0 26 
Debt Outstanding per Capita $887 639 80 4,358 
Financial Viability 28.7% 0.287 .0004 1.693 
Surplus/Deficit 1.02 0.08 0.69 1.26 
Average Income $14,283 3,474 6,284 27,092 
Population Change 7.2% 0.119 -0.107 .877 
 
 
Panel B:  Dummy Variables 
Variable Frequency (# 1/Yes) % of 1/Yes 
Pensions - Overfunded 50 35.7% 
Unqualified Audit Opinion 130 92.9 
Big 6 Auditor 75 53.6 
Initial Audit 17 12.1 
City Manager 83 59.3 
Certificate of Achievement 119 85.0% 
 
 
Correlations based on Pearson’s are summarized in Table 3.  Correlations are a major factor in determining 
the initial SEM models.  Many variables were correlated with audit fees.  Three variables were significantly 
correlated at .0001 included population, tax share, and debt per capita.  Five additional variables were correlated at 
.1.  Population change was negatively correlated with audit fee, suggesting that high-growth cities required less 
extensive audit effort.  All other correlations were in the expected direction (component units, financial viability, 
Big 6, and city manager).  An analysis of correlations across the independent variables was used to model the other 
relationships across the audit fee spectrum.  For example, population was correlated with several of the other 
variables, as were financial viability, population change, Big 6, and manager.  These are likely to be mediating 
variables (that is, they affect some variables and are affected by others) within the audit fee process. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix (Pearson’s) 
 
 
 
P
o
p
 
T
a
x
sh
a
re
 
P
en
si
o
n
s 
C
o
m
p
U
n
it
 
D
eb
tP
C
 
F
V
 
S
u
rD
ef
 
A
v
g
In
c 
C
p
o
p
 
O
p
in
io
n
 
B
ig
 6
 
F
ir
st
Y
r
 
B
S
A
U
D
 
M
g
r 
C
A
 
Audit Fee 62.9* 42.2* -4.4 16.3** 23.2* -24.7** -7.9 1.9 -18.9** 4.1 28.4** 6.7 8.0 -29.0** 10.3 
Population - 12.3 -11.1 28.0 12.6 -17.9** 3.6 -2.5 -8.3 7.6 16.5** 6.8 4.1 -17.8 11.8 
Taxshare  - -0.9 3.0 45.5* -21.5** -9.6 27.4** -23.1** 0.4 31.2** 6.6 4.0 -32.5* 5.7 
Pensions   - -4.7 2.2 25.7** -17.7** 20.8** 5.2 3.3 -11.3 -9.5 -23.8* 22.3** -6.3 
Comp Unit    - -3.0 -12.9 2.8 -11.8 -16.3** 2.0 14.0 -4.7 8.5 -10.6 -15.2 
Debt PC     - -1.6 -10.8 1.3 7.5 -2.5 14.6** 6.8 -4.1 -19.0 4.9 
FV      - 9.3 18.8** 20.0** 2.7 -14.9 -6.1 -19.9** 25.4** 2.3 
Sur/Def       - 11.5 25.2** -2.4 3.5 -0.2 -9.5 5.5 2.3 
Avg Inc        - 12.2 19.6** 8.9 -4.8 -11.2 9.2 16.9 
Pop Chg         - 9.1 4.4 4.1 -20.4** 21.1 12.5 
Opinion          - 13.1 -6.7 2.3 10.9 66.0 
Big 6           - 3.9 -9.0 1.6 13.0 
First Year            - -10.3 -0.4 3.4 
Manager             -22.5* - 14.0 
CA             -9.7  - 
 
* Significant at .0001; ** Significant at .1 
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SEM Results 
 
The initial audit fee SEM model, based on the variables in Figure 1 and correlations (i.e., to identify 
significant relationship), contains the following equations: 
 
Initial SEM Model used: 
 
LNFEE = β1 LNPOP + β2 FV + β3 TAXSHARE + β4 PENSION +  
Β5 COMPUNIT + β6 DEBTPC + β7 FV + β8 SURDEF + β9 AVGINC +   
Β10 CPOP + β11 AUDOPN + β12 BIG6 + β13 FIRSTYR + β14 BSAUD 
+ β15 MGR + β16 CA + e1  
 
FV = β17 MGR + e2 
  
TAXSHARE = β18 MGR + β19 FV + β20 DEBTPC + e3 
 
BIG6 = β21 LPOP +β22 FV + β23 TAXSHARE + e4 
 
COMPUNIT = β24 LNPOP + e5, 
 
where α=intercept, β=coefficient and e=error term. 
 
The sixteen empirical surrogates are potentially associated with audit fees.  Four additional equations are 
added to test possible indirect effects, based on previous literature and the evaluation of correlations. 
 
As expected, the initial SEM model was not robust.  Most goodness of fit tests were weak and many of the 
independent variables were insignificant.  For example, only six of the initial independent variables had significant 
t-values for explaining audit fees.  Relatively large correlations among the exogenous variables required additional 
analysis.  Consequently, we made additional runs to refine the model.  The result is a much simpler model, based on 
significant and theoretically defensible relationships.  The final SEM equations are: 
 
LNFEE = β1 LNPOP + β2 FV + β3 TAXSHARE + β4 COMPUNIT +    
Β5 CPOP + β6 BIG6 + e1  
 
FV = β7 MGR + e2 
  
TAXSHARE = β8 MGR + β9 FV + e3 
 
BIG6 = β10 LPOP + β11 TAXSHARE + e4 
 
COMPUNIT = β12 LNPOP + e5 
 
The final model is summarized in Figure 2.  Since all the variables in the model are observed rather than 
latent variables, they are placed in rectangles.  The arrows signify the expected direction of the relationships. Curved 
lines indicate significant relationships (covariations) across exogenous variables.  A theoretical relationship was not 
anticipated in advance and a directional effect is not obvious.  The relationships across the variables are stated as 
standardized coefficients.  For example, the standardized coefficient between log of population and log of audit fees 
is 58.5.  This implies that a one percent increase in population is associated with 0.6% increased in audit fees.  For 
each equation specified (i.e., an equation is specified for each endogenous variable as shown above), R
2
 is stated in 
bold.  For example, the variance of Big 6 auditor is based on the relationship with log of population and tax share 
and the R
2
 of 18.4% represents the variance in big 6 auditors explained by those variables.  The robustness of the 
SEM model is based on a set of goodness of fit tests described below. 
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Figure 2 
SEM Model—Based on Standardized Coefficients 
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Seven of the eleven original independent variables are in the final model, as summarized in Figure 2.  Four 
of the theoretical constructs are represented as direct effects of audit fees in the final model:  client size as measured 
by log of population; complexity of client operations as measured by taxshare and component units; financial risk as 
measured by financial viability and change in population (a demographic factor); and auditing as measured by Big 6 
auditor.  The directions of the variables are as predicted.  The negative sign for change in population suggests that 
lower (or negative) growth cities require greater audit effort.  Alternatively, this may suggest that negative growth 
cities have higher audit risk.  Governance structure as measure by city manager has no directs effect on audit fees, 
but serves as a mediating factor.  The six direct-effects variables had a combined R
2
 of 60.2% for audit fees and all 
goodness of fit tests are highly significant.   
 
There are four indirect effects, with component unit, big 6 auditor, financial viability, and tax share serving 
as mediating variables.  Financial viability increases with the presence of a city manager, while taxshare decreases.  
This suggests that city managers are more likely to prefer a financial cushion and more likely to rely more on non-
local revenues (for example, by applying for intergovernmental grants).  Log of population is an exogenous variable 
that has both a direct effect on audit fees and positive indirect effects through component units and big 6 auditors.  A 
larger tax share increases the probability of a Big 6 audit.   
 
There are two significant covariations across the exogenous variables.  Log of population negatively 
covaries with city manager.  This suggests that relatively smaller cities are more likely to have a city manager rather 
than a mayor as the chief executive.  City manager positively covaries with change in population.  Municipalities 
using city managers have faster population growth rates than cities with mayors. 
 
The final model is based on a parsimonious model while improving the goodness of fit indices.  The 
goodness of fit tests determine if the tested model should be accepted.  The chi square statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that the model fits the covariance matrix.   As a rule of thumb, a chi square dividend by degrees of 
freedom of less than five (relative chi-square) is a good fit.  In this case, it is 30.79 / 13 or 2.4.  Other goodness of fit 
tests include Bentler & Bonnett’s normed fit index (NFI) with a fit of 88.3% (a value greater than .80 is considered 
acceptable, although some authorities suggest .90), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) which barely 
made the .1 cutoff, and the goodness of fit index (GFI) with a fit of 95% (GFI greater or equal to .90 is considered 
acceptable).  See, for example, Bollen 1989 for an explanation of goodness of fit tests and detailed information on 
SEM analysis.  In general, these measures indicated an adequate model fit. 
 
Comparison to OLS Results 
 
Table 4 
Regression Analysis with Coefficients (t-values) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Audit Fees 
 
Variable Expected Sign Coefficient t-value 
Log of Population + .588 8.93* 
Tax Share + .000 4.68* 
Component Units + .012 1.01 
Financial Viability - -.262 -1.71** 
Population Change ? -.770 -2.13** 
Big 6 + .120 1.29 
City Manager - -.082 -0.90 
Intercept  7.806 21.33* 
R2  64.6%  
F Value  34.41*  
n  140  
* Sign. at .0001; ** Sign. at .1 
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The final regression includes the variables from the final SEM model and shown in Table 4.  Four of the 
independent variables are significant: LPOP, TAXSHARE, FV, and CPOP, all in the expected direction.  The R
2
 
was 64.6%, slightly larger than for the SEM model.  Since the OLS model has all the variables used for SEM, the R
2
 
will almost always be higher than SEM.  The OLS results suggest that MGR is irrelevant relative to audit fees, when 
in fact there are several indirect effects that that are significant.  The advantage of SEM is the complete analysis of 
relationships across all variables, such as the mediation relationship of MGR through several variables. 
 
 An alternative to discover a parsimonious OLS model is stepwise regression.  This approach resulted in a 
four variable model, including LNPOP, TAXSHARE, CPOP and FV.  These are in the SEM model, but represent an 
incomplete presentation of fee relationships, since it excludes COMPUNIT and BIG6 plus the indirect effects of 
MGR and mediating effect of several variables.  It’s not clear that a “final model” similar to SEM is likely using 
only an OLS approach. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The objectives of this project were to model municipal audit fees using an audit economics framework and 
then explore this conceptual framework empirically using structured equation modeling.  A sample of large cities 
using data from 1996 is used for analysis.  The theoretical framework uses five constructs to explain audit fees:  (1) 
client size, (2) complexity of client operations, (3) financial risks including demographic characteristics, (4) auditing 
factors, and (5) governance structure.   
 
Seven variables are in the final model SEM model.  Six of these directly explain audit fees:  LNPOP, 
COMPUNIT, FV, TAXSHARE, CPOP, and BIG6.  The six direct-effects variables had a combined R
2
 of 60.2% and 
all goodness of fit tests were reasonably significant.  MGR has no direct effect on audit fees but influence fees 
indirectly through three other variables. In addition, COMPUNIT, BIG6, FV, and TAXSHARE serve as mediating 
variables for other effects.   
 
SEM provides more information on the overall fee structure.  Corporate governance as measured by city 
manager has significant indirect effects through financial viability and tax share, unobservable when using OLS.  
First, a city manager is more likely to have a larger financial cushion, a measure of fiscal conservatism.  Second, a 
city manager is more likely to rely on intergovernmental grants, which broadens the revenue base and may provide 
relief to local taxpayers.  The other mediating effects work through variables that have significant direct effects, 
including population size and big 6 auditors, providing additional information on complex relationships.  
 
In summary, the results demonstrate that SEM modeling can be used in the context of explaining audit fees 
and provides more information on how the highly correlated independent variables are interrelated in the context of 
explaining audit fee levels.   
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NOTES 
 
1 See, especially, Baber et al. (1987), Rubin (1988), Ward et al. (1994), Deis and Giroux (1996), Sanders et 
al. (1995), Copley et al. (1994), and Elder et al. (1999). 
2 Several auditing papers used SEM, including Kalbers and Fogarty (1993), Shafer et al. (1999), Johnstone 
(2000), Shapeero et al. (2003), Donnelly et al. (2003), and Lowensohn (1996).  SEM proved quite useful in 
auditing research in advancing various behavioral theories. 
3 In certain specific situations OLS regression is not the preferred estimator in audit fee models.  For 
example, Copley et al. (1995) used simultaneous equations (or two stage least squares) to model both the 
demand and supply of auditing services.  Elder et al. (1999) used a self-selection model to analyze audit 
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fees for municipalities that may have also purchased non-audit fees from the same audit firm.  We have 
compared our SEM analysis to OLS as these two unique situations do not apply to our municipal model. 
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